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Comment




In 1994, the California legislature passed the Three Strikes law which creates a
mandatory twenty-five year to life sentence for the commission of a third felony.'
Three Strikes engendered controversy from its inception. For instance, commentators
criticized the break down in the political process which resulted in Three Strikes
being rammed through the legislature. 2 Many people, including some prosecutors,
claim that the law is over-broad because non-violent felons may be sentenced to life
in prison.3 Another point of contention is the huge cost Three Strikes imposes on the
state of California.4 The fact that three judges, including a California appellate court
judge, were involved in promulgating this legislation adds to this controversy. [and
raises the issue of whether it is appropriate for judges to draft legislation.]
In a 1994 debate concerning Three Strikes, Mike Reynolds, the father of a
murder victim and chief proponent of Three Strikes, asserted that three judges drafted
the law.5 Subsequently, the judges acknowledged their involvement in promulgating
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 1998; B.A., California State
University, Sacramento, 1995. 1 would like to thank my wife, Kristina, for her love and support.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1996).
2. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to provide an in-depth analysis of California's Three Strikes
legislation. Rather, this Comment uses Three Strikes as a springboard to examine the propriety of judges
participating in the drafting of legislation. For an excellent critique of Three Strikes, see Michael Vitiello, Three
Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997).
3. See Dwayne Bray, Theft Case at Center of'3 Strikes' Controversy, L.A. TIMEs, July 18,1 994, at B1
(describing a case in which a defendant who stole eighteen bottles of drugstore cologne faced a possible life prison
term under Three Strikes); see also Stone Phillips, NBC Nightly News: California's 'Three Strikes' Law Comes
Under Fire, (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 30, 1994) (discussing a case in which a defendant who had two prior
felony convictions of robbery and attempted robbery, may face life in prison for stealing a piece of pizza from a
group of children at a pizza parlor).
4. See Adam Entous, 'Three Strikes' Law Puts California in a Fiscal Bind, COM. APPEAL, Nov. 25, 1994,
at 4A (stating that Three Strikes will cause an "explosion" in the prison population which will increase costs and
require the construction of more prisons); see also id. (citing a Department of Corrections estimate that Three
Strikes will require the construction of 20 to 25 new prisons and citing a Rand Corporation estimate of a 5.5 billion
dollar annual cost for Three Strikes).
5. Dan Morain, California Elections/Proposition 1984; Sponsor Says Judges Helped Write '3 Strikes;
Legal Experts Say Such Jurists Should Be Disqualified from Cases Involving the Sentencing Measure. Mike
Reynolds Refuses to Identify Those Who Helped Him, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1994, at A3.
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Three Strikes.6 The extent of judges's involvement in developing Three Strikes
remains unclear.7 Although it remains unclear whether the judges actually put pen
to paper in participating in the development of Three Strikes, the scenario raises an
interesting questions regarding not only whether such an action is proper, but also
whether such action is desirable.
Throughout our nation's history, both legislators and judges have called for a
more interactive relationship between the legislature and the judiciary.8 In 1921,
Justice (then Judge) Cardozo advocated the creation of an agency to bridge the gap
between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. 9 Many modem
judges, legislators, and commentators urge an increased interaction between these
two branches. 10 The focus of this Comment will be upon the propriety of judges
drafting legislation, an example of interaction taken, perhaps, to an extreme.
This Comment will begin by addressing the separation of powers doctrine as it
relates to judges drafting legislation. Subsequently, judicial ethics will be examined.
This Comment then will analyze a judge's First Amendment rights and conclude that
the government's interest in maintaining the legitimacy of the judicial institution
outweighs an individual judge's First Amendment right to draft legislation. This
Comment then argues that a judge's role, as defined by the type of legislation and the
judge's purpose in becoming involved with the legislation, determines the propriety
of this type of action. Finally, this comment concludes that, regardless of the type of
legislation, it is unnecessary for any individual judge to draft legislation.
6. Dan Morain,JudgeAdmils His Role hi '3 Strikes' Law: James A. Ardaiz of Fresno State Appellate Panel
Says He Helped Author the Legislation. He had Planned to Recuse Himselffrom 'Substantive' Legal Questions
Involving the Issue, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3.
7. See, e.g., Louis Galvan, Judges Defend Role in '3 Strikes', FRESNo Bail, Oct. 26, 1994, at BI
(representing that the judges acknowledged that they helped write Three Strikes but noting that many other
individuals, who were not judges, gave their input before the final draft was approved). The act of helping another
individual write legislation may encompass little nore than the contribution of an idea. It does not necessarily imply
the actual drafting of the legislation.
8. Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role h
Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1176 (1996).
9. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 114(1921).
10. Geyh, supra note 8, at 1176-77; see id. at 1177 (giving the following reasons for the modern call for the
increased interaction between the judiciary and the legislature: (1) The need to sensitize legislators to the effect their
actions have on an overburdened judiciary; (2) the special expertise of judges; and (3) the need to enlighten the
judiciary about legislative constraints through participation in the legislative process).
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H. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. General Theory Behind the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Judges have unique training which makes them particularly qualified to assess
legislation critically." First, they are trained lawyers familiar with the intricacies of
the law. Second, judges apply the law on a daily basis. Therefore, judges become
familiar with the substantive shortcomings of particular legislation and recognize
common drafting errors that may lead to future problems. Thus, involving judges in
the drafting of legislation arguably would improve the quality of the legislation as
well as save valuable resources which would otherwise be wasted on poorly drafted
legislation.12 However, efficiency must give way to the Constitution: "[T]he fact that
a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating functions
of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution." 3
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'
4
Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control for the judge would then
be the legislator.ts
These concerns regarding the concentration of power gave rise to the doctrine
of separation of powers. Despite the importance of separation of powers to the
framers, they failed to express the theory in the Constitution. Rather, the doctrine is
embedded in the structure of the Constitution. t6 It ensures that one branch of govern
11. See CAL. CODEOFJUD. ETHICs, Canon 4(B) advisory committee commentary (stating that "[a]s a judicial
officer and a person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement
of the law"); MAEVA MARCUS & EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS TOWARD INSTITUTHONAL
CoMrTY: JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS IN THE NEW FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1789-1800 43 (quoting a letter from
Representative Robert Goodloe Harper to Justice Paterson in which Goodloe sought the "views" of the justices of
the Supreme Court regarding the Judiciary Act of 1789 stating that "no persons can be so competent to that task
as judges"); see also Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
279,294 (1991) (stating that judges' professional experiences enable them to develop valuable and practical views
regarding legislation).
12. See Tacha, supra note 11, at 279-80 (arguing that increased communication between the legislative and
judicial branches on the "Biden Bill" would have avoided misunderstanding and facilitated a more efficient
development of the law).
13. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,944(1983).
14. FEDERAuSTNO.47, at 139 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield, 2d ed., 1981).
15. Id. at 141.
16. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I-III (specifying the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches of
government and enumerating their powers); see also Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 201-02 (1928) (stating that the United States Constitution does not expressly mandate separation of powers;
rather it is implicit from the structure of the Constitution); Kristen L. Timm, Note, "The Judge Would Then Be the
Legislator": Dismantling Separation of Powers in the Name of Sentencing Reform-Mistretta v. United States, 65
WASH. L. REv. 249, 250 (1990) (noting that the Constitution does not express the doctrine of separation of powers).
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ment will not impermissibly interfere with the constitutional mandate of another
branch of government. 17 By separating governmental powers, the Framers intended
one branch of government to check the other branches of government and to protect
the individual from oppression."
Nevertheless, separation of powers is not constitutionally mandated for state
legislatures.19 However, all fifty states recognize the separation of powers doctrine.20
California's Constitution expressly provides for the separation of powers.2,
Despite the importance of the separation of powers doctrine, it does not mandate
an absolute separation.' The United States Constitution provides for significant
overlap between the branches of the government. For instance, judges are appointed
by the executive branch;3 the legislative branch may impeach the president; 24 and the
judiciary may strike down both executive and legislative actions should they violate
the Constitution.25 Thus, the Constitution requires an interdependence without which
governance would be impossible.26 Indeed, a modem view of the separation of
powers doctrine perceives the branches as dependent upon one another: In most
instances, at least two branches of the government must work together in order to
accomplish anything that may prejudice individual rights.27
See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 2-1 (1978) (noting that the basis of the
theory was a concern for the individual, yet the means chosen to protect the individual were mechanical and stating
that "structure would thus serve substance, in a framework ultimately supervised by a disinterested judiciary").
17. Jordan Fried, Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: An Analysis of the Role
of the Judiciary, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 704,704 (1989).
18. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 2-1.
19. See, e.g., Dseyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (holding that a state is free to determine whether or
not to recognize the separation of powers doctrine).
20. See Robert M. O'Neil, The Separation of Powers iz a Federal System, 37 EMoRY L.J. 539 (1988),
21. See CA. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
Constitution"); see also I B.E. WnN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNA LAW, Constitutional Law § 107 (noting that the
California Constitution expressly adopted the doctrine of separation of powers).
22. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (observing that the Framers of the federal
Constitution rejected the idea of an absolute separation of powers). Indeed, in Federalist number 47, James Madison
was arguing against opponents of the Constitution who felt that the Constitution did not adequately separate the
powers of the government. He argued that separation of powers did not mean that the branches of government
"ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other." Rather, the doctrine of separation
of powers was concerned with one branch of the government exercising the "whole" power of another branch. See
also FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 140 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield, 2d. ed., 1981).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (declaring that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court").
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments"),
25. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 87, 110-113 (holding that the courts determine whether a
statute is constitutional); see also id. at Ill (declaring that "[lit is, emphatically, the province and duty of the
judicial department, to say what the law is").
26. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (stating that the nation would not be able to effectively
govern itself without interdependence between the separate branches of government).
27. One commentator has summarized our constitutional structure as an "institutional interdependence rather
than functional independence that best summarizes the American idea of protecting liberty by fragmenting power."
TIUBE, supra note 16, at 17; see id. at 16 (demonstrating the notion that branches must cooperate with an example
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In addition to the constitutionally mandated institutional interplay between the
branches of government, in the past, individuals have functioned in more than one
"branch" of the government. For example, judges often lobbied individual members
of Congress for statutory changes and improvements." Federal judges often in-
formally advised Congress during the formative years of our country.29 Several
Supreme Court Justices worked with a congressional committee in amending the
Judiciary Act;30 Two Justices even submitted their own versions of the bill.3 t Indeed
before adopting the final version of the Judiciary Act of 1789, members of Congress
sought the advice of several Justices before they settled upon the final version of the
bill.
32
Many of these incidents occurred shortly after the inception of the United
States.33 One can explain these occurrences in one of two ways. Either the Framers
were willing to look the other way out of necessity, or the Framers did not consider
these activities as intruding upon the separation of powers doctrine.
34
As these examples illustrate, "separation of powers" does not require an absolute
separation. The Framers envisioned a violation of separation of powers only where
"the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another department."35 Thus, whether a judge's active role in the
drafting of legislation violates the separation of powers doctrine requires analysis of
the powers of each branch of government.
of a federal law: Passage of a law requires approval by the legislature, the agreement of the executive brahch who
otherwise can veto the legislation, and the cooperation of the judiciary and the executive branch to enforce the law).
28. See Geyh, supra note 8, at 1174-76 (stating that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
which is in control of the Judicial Conference, lobbies Congress urging support of positions taken by the Judicial
Conference); see also id. at 1172 (noting that the Judicial Conference is composed entirely of federal judges);
Tacha, supra note 11, at 286-88 (giving examples of judges lobbying members of Congress).
29. Tacha, supra note 11, at 286 (1991); see MARCUS & VAN TASSEL, supra note 11, at 41 n.30 (stating that
President Washington often sought the advice of Chief Justice John Jay on a personal basis).
30. MARCUS & VAN TASSEl., supra note 11, at 43; see id. (recounting that the Supreme Court Justices
worked openly with a committee responsible for creating a new Judiciary Act).
31. Id. The two justices were William Patterson and Bushrod Washington. Id.
32. Id.; see id. (noting that after the committee responsible for drafting the Judiciary Act had done so,
Representative Robert Goodloe Harper wrote to Justice James Paterson seeking the Paterson's opinion on the bill
and suggesting that other justices examine the bill); see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 1168-69 (stating that, from our
country's inception, federal judges have participated in the legislative process when proposals have affected federal
court procedure).
33. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (providing examples ofjudges involving themselves with
legislation).
34. See MARCUS & VAN TASSEL, supra note 11, at 35-36 (stating that the original justices of the Supreme
Court recognized the somewhat competing needs of an independent judiciary versus the desire to "make use of the
talents of eminent men" and began to formulate a policy to accommodate both interests).
35. FEDERALISTNO.47, at 140 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield, 2d. ed., 1981).
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B. Judicial and Legislative Functions
The United States Constitution defines the powers of each branch of the govern-
ment.3 Article I of the United States Constitution enumerates the powers of the
legislative branch and grants Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper" to carrying forth its enumerated powers.37 Congress enjoys
sole power within this realm.
Article III defines the judicial power,38 limiting the judiciary to hearing only
"cases and controversies." 39 In Muskrat v. United States,40 the United States Supreme
Court found that legislation passed for the sole purpose of granting specific
individuals standing to challenge the validity of legislation concerning the dis-
tribution of Native American land allotments was invalid.4 The Court found that the
lawsuit failed the "case and controversy" requirement of the United States Con-
stitution because no actual controversy existed between the plaintiffs and the govern-
ment.4 2 Rather, the sole purpose of the legislation was to "settle the doubtful
character of the legislation in question."43 The adjudication required the Court to give
an advisory opinion, a power not granted to the judiciary.' Thus, the enumerated
powers of the court limited judicial action to adjudicating actual disputes.
California's Constitution also prohibits the promulgation of advisory opinions.45
Moreover, California's Constitution expressly requires the separation of powers4 6 and
also defines the powers of each branch of government.' The power to legislate has
been defined as the power to "make, alter, and repeal laws. ' 48 This includes the
power to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishment for those crimes.49 The
36. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I-i1 (enumerating the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of the federal government); see also CAL. CONST. art. IV-VI (documenting the powers of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of California's government).
37. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,202
(1928) (stating that the legislative power is the authority to make laws).
38. U.S. CONST. art. III.
39. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-2.
40. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
41. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 363.
42. Id. at361.
43. u at361-62.
44. Id. at 362.
45. People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 910,912,464 P.2d 126, 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670,671
(1970); see id. (declaring that "[t]he rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the
jurisdiction of this court"); see also People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632, 640,300 P. 23, 26 (1931) (defining the judicial
power as the power "to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation").
46. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
Constitution.").
47. See CAL CONST. art. IV (defining the legislative power); id. art. VI (defining the judicial power).
48. 13 CAL.JuR.3D§ 110, at 251; see lz re Lasswell, I Cal. App. 2d 183, 188-89,36 P.2d 678,680 (1934)
(stating that it is the "purpose, right, and duty" of the legislature to enact legislation).
49. 13 CAL. JUR. 3D § 1I0, at 252.
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judicial power can be defined as the power to "declare the law and determine the
rights of parties to a controversy before the court?' 5° Accordingly, the legislature pos-
sesses the power to define criminal conduct before any wrong is committed; the
judiciary is limited to enforcing the law as it applies to particular instances of conduct
as defined by the legislature.51
In addition to thejudiciary's adjudicatory powers, case law has recognized that
the courts possess other non-adjudicatory powers.52 For example, the power of the
courts to promulgate housekeeping rules is well established.53 In Mistretta v. United
States, the Court declared that the legislative branch could delegate nonadjudicatory
functions to the judicial branch as long as those functions did not "trench [sic] upon
the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of
the Judiciary." 4 Thus, at least the federal courts have been open to the idea of the
judiciary performing functions that are traditionally nonadjudicatory.
C. Modem Separation of Powers Test
1. Functional Approach
In Mistretta v. United States, a criminal defendant challenged federal sentencing
guidelines as violating the separation of powers doctrine.55 The Supreme Court stated
that separation of powers violations are defined by "encroachment and aggrandize-
ment. 56 Provisions of law that "accrete to a single Branch powers more appro-
priately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and
independence of one or another coordinate Branch[es]" violate the Constitution.57
First, the Court examined whether the Act aggrandized power in the judicial
branch. The Court began by recognizing that members of the judicial branch could
conduct some nonadjudicatory functions in addition to deciding cases and contro-
versies.5 8 The Court then reasoned that the power of the judiciary was not expanded
because judges traditionally evaluated the same factors on an individual basis under
50. 7 B.E. WITKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 109 (1988).
51. 13CALJuR.3D§ 109, at249.
52. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,386 (1989).
53. k at 388; see Sibbach v. wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (holding that Congress possesses the authority
to prescribe rules of pleading and practice in the federal courts and further holding that Congress may properly
delegate this authority to the United States Supreme Court).
54. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388.
55. Id. at 370.
56. Id. at 382; see id. ("It is this concern of encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated our
separation of powers jurisprudence").
57. Id.
58. Id. at 386. In particular the court focused upon the generally accepted principle that judges can make
judicial rules. Id at 386-87. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing thejudiciary's authority to make
"housekeeping rules").
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the regime of indeterminate sentencing.59 Therefore, the Act did not unconstitu-
tionally expand the powers of the judiciary.
Second, the Court considered whether the Sentencing Reform Act encroached
upon the judicial function. Encroachment occurs where the judiciary's authority and
independence are undermined.60 The Court looked to the history of judges per-
forming extrajudicial duties and concluded that the separation of powers doctrine
does not prohibit judges from participating in extrajudicial service.61 The Court also
concluded that the judge's participation on the committee did not undermine the
judiciary's impartial appearance because sentencing is traditionally a judicial
function.62 Thus, because judges traditionally made sentencing decisions, the Sen-
tencing Commission was acting within the Judiciary's power.63 Therefore, the Court
found that the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch and
the participation of federal judges on the Commission did not undermine the inde-
pendence or integrity of the judiciary.
2. California
The California Constitution provides that "[plersons charged with the exercise
of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Con-
stitution."' However, California courts have failed to articulate a clear test to deter-
mine a violation of separation of powers.65 The essence of the doctrine in California
seems to be that one branch of the government cannot deny another branch of the
government an exclusive power.66
59. Mistreta, 488 U.S. at 395. "In sum, since substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been and
remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology of rulemaking has been and remains appropriate
to that Branch" the location of the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch does not violate the principle
of separation of powers. See id. at 396-97.
60. Id. at 382; see id. at 407 (noting that the legitimacy of the judiciary hinges upon its impartial
appearance).
61. d. at 398-400; see id at 401 (stating that "Our 200-year tradition of extrajudicial service is additional
evidence that the doctrine of separated powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial
activity"); id at 404 (declaring that the Constitution "does not forbid judges to wear two hats; it merely forbids
them to wear both hats at the same time").
62. Id. at 404; see id. at 407-08 (stating that the Judicial Branch was not participating in the making of law
by determining what acts should be criminalized or participating in the enforcement of the law; rather the
Commission was merely promulgating rules for "the exercise of the Judicial Branch's own business"); id. at 407
(declaring that sentencing "has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by the Judicial Branch").
63. Id. at 407-08.
64. CAl. CONST. art. III, § 3.
65. See 13 CAL JUR. 3D § 100 at 222-23 ("The separation of powers doctrine has throughout its history been
the subject of much conflict in judicial opinions relating to its application ... the courts have struggled to maintain
the doctrine in its pristine rigor, while laboring to devise novel theories to permit government to function in spite
of it.") (footnotes omitted).
66. CAL CoNsT. art. 111, § 3; see 13 CAL JUR. 3D § 101 at 224 (stating that the "chief qualification of the
separation requirement has been by way of denying the exclusive nature of any governmental power or function
other than the basic or ultimate power or authority" of any particular branch of government).
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In Butt v. California,67 the California Supreme Court held that a lower court
violated the separation of powers doctrine when it approved the diversion of
emergency loan funds, that the Legislature intended for other purposes, from
appropriations.6 The court reasoned that the lower court's order impinged on the
legislature's constitutional power to enact appropriations;69 emergency loans must
be specifically appropriated to the district by the legislature. 70 Therefore, because the
funds were earmarked for purposes entirely distinct from an emergency loan to a
school district, the lower court infringed upon the legislative power by approving the
loan.7"
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard criticized the majority
for applying a formalistic conception of separation of powers in which particular
powers can be categorized as falling within the exclusive realm of one of the three
branches of government.72 Justice Kennard argued that the majority's formalistic
classification was inconsistent with the modem understanding of separation of
powers. 73 Justice Kennard relied on Mistretta v. United States4 and on Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services5 in support of her position. 76 Moreover, Justice
Kennard argued that separation of powers is meant to prevent one branch of govern-
ment from exercising the complete power of another branch of government, not to
prohibit appropriate action which incidentally duplicates the power of another branch
of government.
77
The majority in Butt refuted Justice Kennard's argument by stating that ad-
herence to precedent is not rigid or formalistic. 7 The majority worried that Justice
Kennard's approach would give the judiciary "unchecked power" 79 and would
67. 4 Cal. 4th 668,842 P.2d 1240, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (1992).
68. Butt v. California, 4 Cal. 4th 668,674,842 P.2d 1240, 1243, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480,483 (1992).
69. Id. at 698, 842 P.2d at 1260, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
70. Id. at 701,842 P.2d at 1262, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502.
71. Id. at 701-02, 842 P.2d at 1263, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.
72. Id. at 707 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting), 842 P.2d at 1266-67, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506-07.
73. Id. at 707 (Kennard, L, concurring and dissenting), 842 P.2d at 1267, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507.
74. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
75. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
76. See Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 707-08 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting), 842 P.2d at 1267, 15 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 507 (arguing that the California Supreme Court should employ the same analysis as that employed by the
United States Supreme Court).
77. Butt,4 Cal. 4th at 709, 842 P.2d at 1267-68, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507-08; see Younger v. Superior Court,
21 Cal. 3d 102, 117, 577 P.2d 1014, 1024, 145 Cal. Rptr. 674,684 (stating that the purpose of the separation of
powers doctrine "is to prevent one branch of government from exercising the complete power constitutionally
vested in another; it is not intended to prohibit one branch from taking action properly within its sphere that has
the incidental effect of duplicating a function or procedure delegated to another branch") (citations omitted).
78. Butt,4 Cal. 4th at 702, 842 P.2d at 1263, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503; see id. (arguing that the precedent the
court relied on in making its decision was a "practical, sensitive, and principled balance between the legislative and
judicial power over appropriations").
79. Id.
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"elevate" the judiciary above the other branches of government in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine."0
Because Justice Kennard relied upon Mistretta in her objection to the majority
opinion, the majority may have implicitly rejected the separation of powers analysis
adopted by the federal courts." Therefore, California may apply an analysis similar
to that advocated by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Mistretta.2 Justice Scalia argued
that the Constitution is the framework wherein the Framers themselves considered
how much commingling between the branches was acceptable. 3 If the commingling
is not expressly approved in the Cdnstitution, a violation of separation of powers
results.84 Indeed, the California Constitution supports a more rigid analysis because
it explicitly mandates the separation of powers. Such an explicit command provides
much less leeway for theoretical arguments that stretch the concept of separation of
powers.86 Thus, California courts may be more willing to apply a rigid, formal
analysis to separation of powers issues.
Therefore, the applicability in California of the functional approach is suspect.
Insofar as the California Supreme Court has not definitely resolved its position, this
Comment will explore both a formal analysis and a functional analysis to determine
whether a judge violates the separation of powers doctrine by drafting legislation.
3. Drafting Legislation
a. Formal Analysis
Under a formal view of separation of powers, the powers of the three branches
of government are compartmentalized. A violation of the separation of powers
80. Id. at 703,842 P.2d at 1264, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
81. See id. at 703-704, 842 P.2d at 1264, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504 (rejecting Justice Kennard's argument
calling foran analysis similar to that applied in the federal courts). See also id. at 707-08,842 P.2d at 1266-67, 15
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506-507 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that federal authority should govern the
analysis of separation of powers issues).
82. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,426 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a case-by-case
analysis of potential separation of powers violations is wrong).
83. Id.
84. See id. (declaring that "to treat the Constitution as though it were no more than a generalized prescription
that the functions of the Branches should not be commingled too much-how much is too much to be determined,
case-by-cast, by this court" is wrong; instead the Constitution should be viewed as a prescribed structure for the
conduct of government).
85. CAL CoNST. art. I,§ 3.
86. Id.; see id. (stating that "[p]ersons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of
the others except as permitted by this constitution"); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3D § 110, at 251 (defining the legislative
power as the power to "make, alter, or repeal laws"); id. § 109, at 249 (defining the judicial power as the power to
"declare law and determine the rights of parties").
87. See Butt v. California, 4 Cal. 4th 668,709, 842 P.2d 1240, 1267, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480,507 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that a rigid classification of government powers views those particular powers
as being exclusive to one branch of government respectively).
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doctrine occurs where a particular branch of the government exceeds its constitu-
tionally enumerated powers by exercising the power of another branch of the
govemmentas In California, the legislative power is defined as the power to "make,
alter, and repeal" laws,89 whereas the judicial power is defined as the power to
declare the law and determine the rights of the parties before the court.9° Thus, the
legislature defines criminal offenses and punishment for those offenses prior to the
alleged criminal activity whereas the judiciary applies the laws articulated by the
legislature to the particular defendant before the court.9
Drafting legislation does not fall within the judiciary's power to adjudicate legal
rights and determine legal controversies.' Therefore, under a formal analysis, the
judges' participation in the drafting of legislation may violate the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Moreover, neither the United States Constitution nor the California Constitution
permits the judiciary to propound advisory opinions. 93 Judges have a duty to uphold
the Constitution.94 Pursuant to this duty, judges determine the validity of legislation
when it comes before them as a case and controversy.95 However, prior to the enact-
ment of legislation, there is no case or controversy because nobody can be harmed
by a particular piece of legislation that does not exist.96 Thus, a judge acts beyond his
88. See i. at 707,842 P.2d at 1267-68, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506-07 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting)
(characterizing the majority's interpretation of separation of powers as being formalistic and describing the
formalistic approach as characterizing functions and assigning them exclusively to one of the three branches of
government).
89. 13 CAL. JtJR. 3D § 110 at 251 (citing People v. Seymour 16 Cal. 332 (1860) in support of this pro-
position).
90. See 1 B.- WnN, SuMMARY oFCALIVRNIA LAw, Canstitutional Law § 109 (summarizing the judicial
powers).
91. See In re Lasswell, I Cal. App. 2d 183, 188-89, 36 P.2d 678,680 (1934) (stating that "the courts have
no voice in the policy nor in the wisdom of legislative action; they construe the language of the statute and
determine its constitutional status"); In re Shrader, 33 Cal. 279, 283 (1867) (declaring that "[1]egislative power
prescribes rules of conduct for the government of the citizen or subject, while judicial power punishes or redresses
wrongs growing outofa violation of rules previously established"); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3d § 109, at 249 (making
the same distinction).
92. See CAL CONST., art. VI (vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior
courts, and municipal courts); People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632, 640, 300 P. 23, 26 (1931) (defining the judicial power
as the power "to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation" and noting
that this power consists of adjudicating legal rights). See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT., art. III (limiting the judicial power to
deciding "cases and controversies").
93. See supra notes 38-45 (reviewing authority prohibiting the judiciary from furnishing advisory opinions).
94. See, e.g. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 87, 111-13 (declaring that judges have a duty to follow
the Constitution); see also id. at 112-13 (quoting the judicial oath of office:
I do solemnly swear, that I will administer justice, without respect to persons, and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me
as -, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constilution and laws
of the United States").
Id. (emphasis added).
95. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 347,361-62 (1911).
96. See id. at 357 (stating that "case and controversy" implies the existence of adverse parties "whose
contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication").
1997/Judges As Legislators?
or her constitutional power when the judge comments upon the validity of legislation
prior to the existence of a true case and controversy.'
By drafting legislation, a judge implicitly asserts that the legislation is valid.'
Given the judge's duty to uphold the constitution, we must assume the judge thought
that the legislation was valid-otherwise the judge would not have drafted it. There-
fore, a close analogy can be drawn between a judge drafting legislation and a judge
rendering an impermissible advisory opinion.
Even under a rigid analysis, courts have traditionally distinguished actions
undertaken by a judge while acting as a judge and actions undertaken by a judge
while acting as an individual. 9 Only actions of the judiciary as an institution were
subjected to review under the separation of powers doctrine."to Shortly after the
inception of the United States, Supreme Court Justices participated in activities, such
as the formulation of legislation, that could be considered a violation of separation
of powers."1 Indeed, some justices even drafted legislation themselves and submitted
it to congressional committees.' 2 This conduct by judges, who were charged with
a duty to uphold the constitution, so proximate to the founding of our country, com-
bined with the lack of any authority finding a separation of powers violation for
individual conduct supports the proposition that, so long as judges act as individuals,
they do not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Using the Three Stikes scenario, did the judges who helped promulgate Three
Strikes act as individuals or did they act as judges? Mike Reynolds, the driving force
behind the Three Strikes law, is a family acquaintance of one of the judges.' °3
Reynolds asked for to help in drafting the legislation shortly after Reynolds' daughter
was murdered in 1992."4 Mr. Reynolds did not petition the court for action but rather
approached the judges in an individual capacity. The judges did not invoke any
judicial powers. These facts strongly suggest that the judges acted as individuals.
Moreover, the fact that the judges' participation in the drafting of Three Strikes
97. See id. at 361 (declaring that the court cannot declare legislation valid or invalid absent the existence
of a true case or controversy).
98. See Timm, supra note 16, at 264 (arguing that when a judge participates in the promulgation of
sentencing guidelines, the judge "symbolically places ajudicial seal of approval" on the legislation).
99. MARCUS & VAN TASsEl, supra note 11, at 36-37; see id. (noting that the Supreme Court Justices
developed the distinction in response to events taking place in the 1790s); see also Geyh, supra note 8, at 1172
(stating that judges historically communicated with the legislature on an individual basis and continue to do so
today).
100. MARCUS & VAN TASSEL, supra note 11, at 36 (describing the distinction enunciated by the Supreme
Court as one wherein the court as an institution would "adhere scrupulously" to the separation of powers doctrine
while thejustices as individuals were free to participate in activities that would otherwise appear inappropriate for
the judiciary as an institution).
101. Seesupra notes 28-32 and ace ompanying text (recounting examples ofextra-judicial activity by Supreme
Court Justices early in the formative years of the United States).
102. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (detailing the example of Supreme Court Justices drafting
versions of the Jud. Act of 1789).
103. Morain, supra note 5, at A3.
104. Id.
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remained unknown shows the individual nature of the action because institutional
actions would be more public. 05 Therefore, it appears that the judges acted as
individuals and their actions did not violate the separation of powers doctrine under
a rigid analysis.
b. Functional Analysis
In Mistretta, the United States Supreme Court stated that separation of powers
violations are defined by encroachment and aggrandizement. t°6 It declared that a vio-
lation will only be found where one branch of the government impounds powers to
itself which should be spread between the branches of government or where the
actions of one branch of the government undermine the authority or independence
of that branch of government. 7
i. Does the drafting of legislation by a judge accrete power to the
judiciary which is more appropriate to the legislative branch?
Although "making law" is hard to define, examples taken from the legislative
process shed light on the meaning of this phrase. For instance, members of the legis-
lature do not hold a monopoly upon drafting legislation. Legislative staff and legis-
lative counsel are key participants in the drafting function yet these participants are
not considered law makers in a government powers context. In addition, lobbyists,
who are private citizens, often submit legislation to members of the legislature to
further their clients' interests. Private citizens also have been known to draft legis-
lation and submit it to the legislature. 08
The activities of the Judicial Conference are, perhaps, most relevant to this
analysis. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts drafts legislation to
implement proposals of the Judicial Conference and submits this legislation to mem-
bers of Congress for introduction as bills.'09 The Judicial Conference, which is made
up entirely of federal court judges,1  controls the Administrative Office.' Thus, in
essence, the federal judiciary submits drafts of legislation to Congress on a regular
105. See id. (reporting that one of the judges acknowleded his participation in the promulgation of Three
Strikes long after the proposed legislation became known to the public).
106. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,382 (1989) (declaring that separation of powers violations
are defined by encroachment and aggrandizement).
107. Id.
108. Mike Reynolds is a private citizen who was involved with three judges in drafting the Three Strikes
legislation in California. See Morain, supra note 5, at A3 (stating that Mike Reynolds collaborated with the judges
to "write a measure aimed at imprisoning repeat offenders").
109. Geyh, supra note 8, at 1174-75. The Judicial Council of California provides a strikingly similar analog
wherein judges, through the Council, participate in creating legislation dealing with court administration, practice,
and procedure. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
110. Geyh, supra note 8, at 1172.
111. Id. at 1174.
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basis. Despite the judiciary's involvement with drafting legislation, nobody has
challenged this practice as a violation of separation of powers. If these actions are
considered "making law," this practice violates the separation of powers doctrine
because the judiciary would be accreting legislative power to itself. However, the
Court has never found fault with this practice, implying that judges do not "make
law" by drafting legislation.
The legislature's ability to pass legislation seems to define the power to make
law. As discussed above, numerous people who are not legislators often draft legis-
lation. Yet the legislature, alone, enjoys the power to breathe life into legislation.'
t 2
Thus, the essence of "making law" appears to be the power to give pending legis-
lation legal force, which is done through approval of the legislature." 3 Three Strikes
did not become law when the judges drafted the legislation. Only when the legis-
lature approved Three Strikes did it become law-the judges did not interfere with
the making of the law because the judges played no role in the legislative approval.
Therefore, the judge's participation in drafting the statute did not inappropriately
divert power to the judiciary.
In addition, sentencing traditionally is an aspect of the judicial function. '4 In
Mistretta, the United States Supreme Court upheld placement of the United States
Sentencing Commission in the Judicial Branch of the government and upheld the
participation of federal judges on that commission." 5 The court reasoned that
because sentencing is a function "peculiarly shared" among the branches of govern-
ment, judicial participation did not improperly accrete power to the judiciary." 6 Since
Three Strikes enhances the penalties for repeat offenders of violent crimes, "' it may
be appropriately characterized as a sentencing measure. According to reasoning in
Mistretta, judges would not have been acting outside their judicial role by involving
themselves in activity concerning sentencing. Therefore, involvement in drafting
criminal sentencing legislation would not violate separation of powers.
112. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (declaring that the Senate and the Assembly are vested with the legislative
power); see also In re Lasswell, I Cal. App. 2d 183, 188-89 (1934) (stating that the legislative power consists of
enacting legislation). But see CAL CoNsT. art II, § 8 and § 9; id., art. IV, § i(granting the people the power to make
and repeal law through the initiative and referendum process). It should be noted that the making of laws by the
people involves no government power and is distinct from the separation of powers issue. The legislature remains
the sole branch of government that holds the power to give ideas the force of law.
113. See FEDERALIsT No. 78, at 270 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield, 2d ed., 1981) (stating that the
judiciary is the weakest branch of the government and that the judiciary cannot really do anything to jeopardize
liberty without the aid of one of the other two branches of goverment). Here, the bill drafted by three judges did
not become law until the valid actions of the legislature made it law.
114. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (stating that "substantive judgement in the field
of sentencing has been and remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch"). But see supra note 51 and accompanying
text (declaring that in California the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties is a legislative power).
115. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390.
116. Id at 390-91; see id at 391 (analogizing the participation of the judiciary in promulgating sentencing
guidelines to the promulgation of rules of procedure by the courts under the enabling acts).
117. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (imposing a prison term of 25 years to life
imprisonment for individuals convicted of a third felony).
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ii. Does the Drafting of Legislation by a Judge Encroach Upon the
Judicial Function?
Where actions encroach upon the judicial function, a violation of separation of
powers will be found."8 Encroachment occurs where the judiciary's authority and
independence are undermined." 9 The impartial appearance of the judiciary is critical
to the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial branch 120 because the judiciary's
legitimacy derives from the public perception that the judiciary is impartial and inde-
pendent. 21 Public cynicism towards the judicial system jeopardizes the authority of
the judicial branch and magnifies the need for the appearance of an impartial
judiciary."
Separating the judiciary from politics preserves this appearance of impartiality."2
By drafting legislation, a judge participates in a function typically considered legis-
lative and thus political. 24 Therefore, by participating in drafting legislation, judges
surrender their politically impartial appearance. Moreover, when judges draft legis-
lation, they implicitly assert that the legislation is valid.'25 This apparent approval
suggests that the judge has decided the legislation is valid and will not be impartial
when he or she decides a challenge to the legislation. Drafting legislation is
analogous to pretrial statements of a judge. If a judge, prior to a particular defen-
dant's trial, announced to the press that she thinks that the defendant is guilty, com-
mon sense weighs against the conclusion that the judge could decide the case in a
neutral manner. 26 When a judge drafts legislation, the appearance of partiality is
arguably worse.
118. Mistretta, 488 US. at 382; see id. (stating "[i]t is this concern of encroachment and aggrandizement that
has animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence"); see also id. at 383 (articulating the following two dangers
that concern the court where the Judicial Branch is specifically involved: (1) That the Judicial Branch does not
perform tasks more appropriate to other branches (aggrandizement) and (2) that the institutional integrity or the
Judicial Branch remains intact (encroachment) (citations omitted)).
119. Id. at 382.
120. See Timm, supra note 16, at 264 (stating that impartiality is key to judges' ability to decide cases
effectively).
121. Fried, supra note 17, at 729.
122. See Geyh, supra note 8, at 1167 (suggesting that the public views the judiciary cynically and citing the
dissatisfaction with the verdicts in the O.J. Simpson and Rodney King trials as examples of public frustration with
the judiciary); see also id. (stating that the judiciary's increased role in statutory reform has increased the public
cynicism with the judicial branch of the government).
123. Timm, supra note 16, at 263-64.
124. See id. at 264 (condemning the participation of federal judges on the United States Sentencing
Commission because such participation involves the judiciary in political functions).
125. See id. (arguing that when a judge participates in the promulgation of sentencing guidelines, the judge
"symbolically places a judicial seal of approval" on the legislation).
126. See J. Clark Kelso, Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on Extrajudicial Speech by Judges, 28 LOY.
LA.L REv. 851,857 (1995) (posing a similar hypothetical); id. at 864-65 (stating that a judge's claim that she can
remain neutral despite her pretrial statements is analogous to a judge's claim that he or she can remain neutral when
judging a statute that he or she drafted: both assertions "defly] common sense and experience").
1997/Judges As Legislators?
Ordinarily, the text and the intent of an independently drafted statute impose a
buffer between a judge's opinion and the result reached by that judge. However,
where a judge sits in judgment of a statute he or she drafted, the buffer imposed by
the text and intent of the legislation is removed. The judge sits in judgment of his or
her own creation that the judge already determined was valid.
Moreover, one judge's participation in the drafting of legislation may influence
the decision of other judges who hear a challenge to the legislation at another time.'27
Other judges may be more willing to give the legislation the benefit of the doubt or
assess the legislation less critically when another judge drafted the legislation.'28
The federal analysis of separation of powers issues is supposed to provide a more
flexible, case-by-case approach to these issues which, in turn, allows for greater
interaction between the branches of govemment.' 9 Ironically, however, the emphasis
on the appearance of impartiality in the federal analysis calls into doubt this type of
interaction. 30 Arguably, judges who draft legislation could possibly convey the
appearance of partiality and, therefore, such activity could encroache upon the
judicial function by undermining the authority and independence of the judiciary.
Advocates of an increased role for judges in the legislative process distinguish
between the judge's personal views and the judge's ability to apply established law
objectively in the courtroom.' This argument presupposes the estrangement of a
judge's personal views from the law. But when a judge participates in the drafting
of legislation, his or her personal views become intertwined with the proposed legis-
lation.'32 This casts doubt upon the impartiality of the judge and, in turn, conjures the
specter of a separation of powers violation.
127. See Fried, supra note 17, at 727 (asserting that judges may be "swayed" by the participation of another
judge in the articulation of sentencing guidelines and therefore the judge may not be able to give an impartial
adjudication); Tims, supra note 16, at 264 (stating that judicial participation in an arguably legislative arena could
predispose other judges in favor of the rule or law).
128. Timm, supra note 16, at 264; see id. (citing respect for a colleagues' judgment as the source of bias in
favor of the law).
129. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381-83 (1989) (recogniiing that the United States
Constitution does not require a "hermetic division among the Branches" and accepting commingling so long as no
encroachment or aggrandizement exists); see also Butt v. Californiat, 4 Cal. 4th 668,707-08, 842 P.2d at 1267-68,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507-08 (recognizing the federal approach as flexible and approving commingling so long as
complete aggrandizement does not occur).
130. See supra notes 124-28, and accompanying text (discussing the appearance of partiality conveyed by
the judiciary participating in the drafting of legislation).
131. See Kelso, supra note 126, at 852 (recognizing that judges can argue that their personal views outside
the courtroom do not interfere with their application of the law in the courtroom to circumvent Canon 4 of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits extrajudicial activities which cast doubt on a judge's ability to
act impartially).
132. See Timm, supra note 16, at 264 (noting that when judges draft legislation they implicitly assert the
legislation is valid). Thus, the judge asserts his or her own personal view that the substance of the legislation is
beneficial or desirable and that the legislation is legally valid. But see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406-07 (stating that
a judge's participation on the sentencing commission, whieh promulgates sentencing guidelines, does not affect
a judge's ability to impartially adjudicate sentencing issues).
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Conversely, arguments exist against the conclusion that the participation of
judges drafting legislation conveys the appearance of impartiality. First, in Mistretta
the United States Supreme Court reasoned that by participating in the promulgation
of sentencing guidelines, judges were merely participating in a traditional function
of the judiciary.133 Because Three Strikes arguably can be described as a sentencing
law, the judiciary may merely be participating in a traditional judicial function." 4
Tradition tends to cloak the judge with the air of legitimacy.
Second, recusal and disqualification serve to mitigate the appearance of
impartiality. When a lawyer believes a judge cannot adjudicate the controversy, the
lawyer may seek to disqualify the judge. 135 Similarly, when a judge doubts his or her
ability to adjudicate a controversy impartially, the judge must recuse himself or
herself.
136
Despite its apparent promise, recusal may not overcome the problem of partiality
because only the judge who drafted the legislation would be subject to recusal.
However, the judge's participation may influence the decisions of other judges. 137
Therefore, recusal would not entirely solve the problem of partiality.
138
In summary, although the answer remains unclear whether a judge who drafts
legislation violates the separation of powers doctrine, such an action raises serious
questions. To begin, a judge may cross "the line" into the legislative sphere of power
when the judge drafts legislation, thus resulting in a violation of separation of
powers. 39 Moreover, such an act tends to impugn the impartiality and integrity of the
judiciary which may, by itself, constitute a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine."' Conversely, courts traditionally draw a distinction between individual and
institutional action when determining whether a judge's actions comprise a violation
of separation of powers.' 4' In such circumstances, individual action does not violate
separation of powers. Yet, this distinction appears artificial when one considers that
a judge is equally capable of harming the authority and independence of the judiciary
while acting as an individual or as a judge. Recognizing the artificiality of this
133. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407.
134. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (stating that Three Strikes enhances the criminal penalties
for repeat offenders and concluding that, therefore, Three Strikes can be characterized as a sentencing statute).
135. "Ajudge shall be disqualified if... (C) a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt
that the judge would be able to be impartial." See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRQC. CODE § 170.1(a)(6) (West Supp. 1997).
136. "A judge shall be disqualified if... (A) the judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests
ofjustice, [or] (B) thejudge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial." See, e.g.,
CAt. Civ. Ptoc. CODE § 170.1(a)(6) (West Supp. 1997).
137. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (noting thatother judges may be biased by the authorship
of another judge).
138. See Timn, supra note 16, at 264 (stating that the disqualification of judges will not diminish the effects
on other judges).
139. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 126-30 and'accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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distinction, ethical guidelines for judges do not distinguish between official and
individual action.
III. JUDICIAL ETHICS
The California Code of Judicial Ethics which was adopted to enhance public
confidence in the judiciary, 142 recognizes that a fair, competent, and independent
judiciary is central to our justice system.14 The Code of Judicial Ethics is binding
upon judges.'4 In order to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciaiy,'4 the Code requires judges to preserve the "integrity and independence"
of the judiciary."'4
The Code of Judicial Ethics, unlike the separation of powers doctrine, 147 makes
no distinction between official judicial conduct versus individual conduct. 48 Because
public confidence is immensely important to the judiciary, 49 judges must expect
constant public scrutiny.' 50 Therefore, the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that
judges accept greater restrictions upon their conduct than other members of the
community.'
The Code of Judicial Ethics requires that judges act with integrity and
impartiality.'52 Canon 2 requires judges to "act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."' 53 Canon 4
mandates that ajudge's extrajudicial activities shall not "cast reasonable doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially"' S or compromise the integrity or independence
of the judiciary. 5 The test to determine whether a judge acted in an improper man-
142. CAL CODE OF JUD. ETHICS, Preamble.
143. Id Canon 1; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,407 ("The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship!); Fried, supra note 17, at 729 (stating that
judicial legitimacy derives from the impartial and independent public perception of the judiciary); see also id. at
725 (stating thejudiciary's adjudicatory legitimacy depends upon thejudiciary's independent judgment); Timm,
supra note 16, at 264 (arguing that judges need to be impartial in order to decide cases effectively).
144. CAL CODE OFJUD. ETHICS, Preamble, advisory committee commentary.
145. Id. Canon 1; see id. (stating that violations of the Code diminish public confidence in the judiciary
which, in turn, undermines the American system of government under law).
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (stating that when judges act as individuals, they do not
violate the separation of powers doctrine).
148. See CALCODEOFJuD. ETICS, Preamb!e (stating that the Code of Judicial Ethics "establishes standards
for ethical conduct ofjudges on and off the bench").
149. See id. Canon I (noting that irresponsible or unfair judicial conduct undermines the American system
of government).
150. ld. Canon 2.
151. Id.
152. See id. Preamble, Canon I, Canon 2, & Canon 4.
153. Id. Canon 2.
154. CAL CODE OFJUD. ETHICS, Canon 4.
155. Id.; see also id. Canon 5 (requiring a judge to avoid political activity that may create an impartial or
improper appearance).
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ner is whether a "person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain doubt that the
judge would be able to act with... impartiality.'
't56
The Code of Judicial Ethics raises serious questions regarding the propriety of
judges drafting legislation because that participation possibly conveys the appearance
of partiality. 7 First, when ajudge drafts legislation, the judge appears to have made
up his or her mind before the statute is challenged. 5 8 Second, the judge's
participation directly calls into question the judge's impartiality regardless of
appearances."" Third, a judge who drafts legislation may influence the decisions of
other judges raising the specter of improper influence on their decisions. t5 Finally,
depending upon the content of the legislation, the judge's activity may impart the
appearance of political bias prohibited by Canon 5.161 Thus, whether a judge acted
as an individual or as a judicial officer when drafting the legislation, such activity
appears to violate the Code of Judicial Ethics' prohibition against conduct casting
doubt upon the impartiality of the judiciary.
Conversely, the Code of Judicial Ethics allows judges to participate in activities
designed to improve the law.'62 The Code provides that, subject to the other require-
ments contained in the Code, a judge "may speak, write, lecture, teach, and partici-
pate in activities concerning legal ... subject matters."' 63 In addition, the Code
encourages judges to participate in the revision of substantive and procedural law.'
64
The primary reason for allowing judges to participate in improving the law is that
judges are in a unique position to improve the law because of their experience and
156. Id. Canon 2.
157. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying test (discussing the problems of impartiality that arise when
judges draft legislation).
158. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (arguing that when a judge drafts legislation the judge's
personal views become intertwined with that legislation rendering an impartial adjudication impossible).
160. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
161. See CAL. CODE OF JtD. ETHics, Canon 5 (stating that judges shall "avoid political activity that may
create the appearance of political bias or impropriety").
162. See I, Canon4(C)(2) (permitting judges to participate on committees or commissions concerned with
improving the law or the legal system); see also id. Canon 5(D) (allowing for judicial participation in political
activities designed to improve the law or the legal system in general).
163. Id., Canon 4(B); see Mark Scott Bagula & Judge Robert C. Coates, Trustees of the Justice System:
Quasi-Judicial Activity and the Failure of tle 1990 ABA Model Code of Judiclal Conduct, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
617,620 (1994) (calling for judges to protect, defend, and repair the justice system so long as their activities uphold
the dignity of the courts).
164. CAL. CODE OF Jtll). ETmrs, Canon 4(B) advisory committee commentary; see id. (authorizing a judge
to contribute to improving the law individually or as a member of a group concerned with improving the law).
Indeed, in a 1987 law review article, Justice Ginsburg called for the creation of statutory revision commission
consisting of legislators and retired judges in order to correct imperfections in the law. Active judges would play
a role in identifying problems and bringing them to the committee's attention. See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Peter W. Huber, The lntercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REy. 1417, 1433 (1987).
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education.1 65 Other reasons for encouraging quasi-judicial activity 166 include in-
creased judicial efficiency, independence, impartiality, vitality, and public image. 6
7
When a judge drafts legislation the judge participates in activities concerning a
legal subject matter. Thus, the judge's activity appears to fall within the protections
afforded quasi-judicial activities by Canon 4. However, Canon 4 subordinates a
judge's quasi-judicial activity to other requirements of the Code'" whereas the pro-
visions of the Code of Ethics that explicitly mandate the appearance of impartiality
do so unconditionally.169
Even if a judge acts in a quasi-judicial manner the judge may violate the Code
of Ethics by appearing impartial through his or her activities; acting in a quasi-
judicial function and conveying a partial appearance are not mutually exclusive.'70
Drafting a controversial statute provides an excellent example of a situation where
a reasonable person could possibly view a judge as appearing partial. Both the form
and the substance of Three Strikes engenders much controversy.'7' By participating
in the drafting of this controversial statute, a judge may make his or her views
known, arguably implying partiality in favor of the controversial statute.1
72
A reasonable person test does not provide much guidance for judges in
complying with the Code of Judicial Ethics. Judicial participation in the drafting of
controversial statutes exemplifies the risk of a biased appearance that the Code of
Judicial Ethics seeks to guard against. But what about less controversial statutes?
What about the valid role of judges in improving our laws? It is not enough to
categorize legislation as controversial or benign in making these determinations. 73
Even the participation of judges in drafting seemingly non-controversial legislation
may raise the specter of bias or partiality because of the political nature of the act. 74
165. CAL CODEO FJUD. ETHIcs, Canon 4(B) advisory committee commentary; see Bagula & Coates, supra
note 163, at 630 (1994) (stating that judges are "uniquely suited" to identifying and resolving problems with the
legal system).
166. See CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 4(B) (listing, under the heading of "Quasi-judicial and
Avocational Activities," speaking, writing, lecturing, teaching, and participating in other activities); see also Bagula
& Coates, supra note 170, at 632 (stating that quasi-judicial activity includes teaching the law, writing, and
reforming legislation).
167. Bagula & Coates, supra note 163, at 632.
168 CAL. CODE OFJUD. ETmCS, Canon 4(B).
169. See id, Canon 1, Canon 2(A), & Canon 4(A).
170. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It the Sirens Call?: Judges and Free Speech While Cases are Pending, 28
LOY. L.A.L. REV. 831,838 (1995) (noting that a judge's quasi-judicial activities, such as making statements about
the law, may undermine the judge's appearance of impartiality).
171. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (detailing the controversy surrounding Three Strikes).
172. See, e.g., Dan Morain, Judge Admits His Role in '3 Strikes', L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3
(purportedly quoting an unnamed judge who asserts that the law is very prosecution oriented).
173. See Dan Morain, Judge Admits His Role in '3 Strikes', L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3 (quoting Jerome
Falk, the head of the California Academy of Appellate Attorneys, who argued that the judges' participation in the
drafting of'Three Strikes did not violate the canons ofjudicial conduct and asserted that it is difficult to differentiate
mundane and controversial issues).
174. See Geyh, supra note 8, at 1167 (recognizing that the judiciary's increased role in statutory reform has
increased the public cynicism regarding the judiciary).
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Given the ambiguity of the Code of Judicial Ethics, a judge should think hard about
participating in such activities and the nature of his or her participation because, as
the Code of Judicial Ethics recognizes, an individual judge's actions reflect upon the
judiciary as a whole. 75 At the same time, the ambiguous "reasonable person" test
contained in the Code of Judicial Ethics provides little guidance to a well-meaning
judge seeking to contribute to society. Judges and society would benefit from a more
definite standard.
When a judge chooses to participate in the drafting of a statute that imperils the
impartial appearance of the judiciary, the government needs to limit the judge's
participation through the ethics codes or through a separation of powers analysis.
This raises the question of whether the government may constitutionally limit a
judge's actions in promulgating legislation.
176
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON A JUDGE'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." 77 The First Amendment promotes
a market place of ideas wherein individuals, not the government, determine the truth
or values of such ideas.'78 The promotion of political speech underlies much of the
First Amendment protections.179 Drafting legislation also embodies political expres-
sion. Therefore, the drafting of legislation falls squarely within the protections of the
First Amendment.
Despite its uncompromising language, the First Amendment does not provide
absolute protection for expressive activities.'8s The government employs judges and,
therefore, ajudge's speech may be examined in the context of a public employee.'
175. CA. CoDEoFJuD.EThIcs, Canon 1(A); see id. (stating that "ajudge should participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved") (emphasis added). "Public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to this responsibility." See also id. Canon
I(A), advisory committee commentary (emphasis added).
176. See discussion infra, Part IV (discussing First Amendment limitations on the government's ability to
curtail ajudge's speech).
177. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
178. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, L dissenting) (referring to the
purposes of the First Amendment as a "free trade in ideas" and championing the "competition of the market").
179. See ALExmDER MEIK IoHN, FREE SPEECH AND rrs RELATION TO SELF-GOVEM MENT, in ALEXANDER
MEOKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDoM, 27 (1965) (stating that "Mhe principle of the freedom of speech springs from
the necessities of the program of self-government"); see also id, at 24-28 (providing the example of a town meeting
and arguing that free speech is a political necessity in our system of government); cf. Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 27-31 (1971) (concluding that the sole purpose
of free speech is political).
180. See, e.g., Konigsber v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (rejecting the view "that
freedom of speech and association.... as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes"' and
recognizing that "the constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk").
181. See generally Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990).
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The government's interest in promoting efficient public service may outweigh an
individual employee's interest in commenting upon public matters." 2 This rule arises
from the recognition that the government plays a dual role as both an employer and
as a governmental entity subject to the constraints of the First Amendment.8 3 A
government employee's speech must touch upon a matter of public concern to invoke
this balancing test.'8
In determining whether a public employee commented upon a matter of public
interest, the courts examine the content, form, and context of a given statement.
85
Absent a reference to political, social, or other concerns of a community, the courts
will not consider the statement a "public statement."' Based upon the above criteria,
the United States Supreme Court, in Connick v. Myers 7 held that a questionnaire
distributed by an assistant district attorney to fellow employees regarding employ-
ment conditions was not a matter of public concern. 88 The court reasoned that if the
questionnaire were released to the public, the public merely would be apprised that
one of the assistant district attorneys was upset about a situation at work. 89
The drafting of Three Strikes stands in stark contrast to the situation in Connick.
The content, form, and context of the statements in the Three Strikes legislation
scream public concern. The content deals with enhancing punishment for crimes, an
obvious matter of public concern. The judge's expression took the form of a public
law. In addition, Three Strikes is a reaction to the perception that criminals run
182. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (1987); see, e.g. Connick v. Myers 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that a District
Attorney's interest in maintaining office relationships and an efficient work environment outweighed an employees
right to free expression in surveying colleagues for their opinions regarding the internal office policies of the
District Attorney's Office).
183. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (1987); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (noting that "government offices could
not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter").
184. Rankln, 483 U.S. at 384 (1987). Where a government employee's speech does not touch upon a matter
of public concern the courts are reluctant to second guess the decisions of the government in responding to the
actions of one of its employees. Id. at 386, n.7.
185. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
186. Id. at 146. Where a public employee comments upon matters of personal interest rather than on matters
of public interest, the courts generally will defer to the judgment of the employer regarding the restrictions on a
public employee's speech. See id. at 147.
187. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
188. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-50. The Court did in fact hold that the question regarding whether assistant
district attorneys felt pressured to work on political campaigns touched upon a matter of public concern. Therefore,
the court continued the public employee speech analysis regarding this question. See id. at 149-50.
189. Id. at 148; see id. (noting that Myers was not seeking to inform the public that the District Attorney's
Office was not performing its duties or that the district attorney's office committed any wrongdoing; rather, Myers'
questionnaire was merely designed to give Myers' more ammunition to confront her superiors with).
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rampant in our society." In this context, Three Strikes clearly is an issue of public
importance involving both social and political issues.1 91
Where speech involves matters of public concern, the court must balance the
government's interest as an employer in promoting efficient service against the
interests of the individual citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern.
192
The state bears the burden of proving, "on legitimate grounds," that its interest out-
weighs that of the individual citizen. t93 In Rankin v. McPherson,194 a clerical worker
at a Constable's office challenged her dismissal for a statement she made in response
to the assassination attempt on President Reagan."9 Specifically, McPherson stated
that "if they go for him again, I hope they get him."' 96 Soon thereafter, the Constable
fired McPherson because of her statement.197 The Supreme Court found that
McPherson's statement did not interfere with the effective functioning of the
Constable's office.," Therefore, the Supreme Court declared the Constable's ter-
mination of McPherson unconstitutional.199
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the government/employee analysis
to limitations upon judges' freedom of expression. In Scott v. Flowers,200 the Texas
Commission on Judicial Conduct reprimanded Scott, a justice of the peace, for a
public letter he wrote to the Board of Supervisors.01 Scott's letter criticized the dis-
trict attorney's office and the county court at law for dismissing or severely reducing
fines for traffic violations for those individuals who appealed their fines to the county
court of law.202 The Commission alleged that Scott's conduct only served to discredit
190. See, e.g., Adam Entous, 'Three Strikes' Law Puts California in Fiscal Bind, COM. APPEAL (Memphis),
Nov. 25, 1994, at A4 (noting that Three Strikes was "prompted by a public outcry over violent crime and revulsion
at the murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas").
191. The extensive media coverage of Three Strikes clearly demonstrates the public nature of this topic. The
search "California and 'three strikes' w/20 prison w/20 life" in the LEXIS News Library, revealed 800 stories.
192. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); see Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. at 568
(noting that the problem in governmentlemployer speech cases is "to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees").
193. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
194. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
195. Id. at381.
196. lId
197. Id. at 382.
198. Id. at 388-89; see id. at 389-90 (reasoning that McPherson was not terminated based upon her work
performance, her effect upon other employees, or her discrediting of the office in the eyes of the public); see also
id at 390-91 (declaring that "where an employee serves no confidential, policy making, or public contact role, the
danger to the agency's successful functioning from that employee's private speech is minimal").
199. Id. at 392.
200. 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990).
201. Id. at 204.
202. Id. at 203-04; see id. (recounting Scott's concern that this practice unfairly allowed a few individuals
who knew to appeal their cases to suffer no consequences while less sophisticated individuals were penalized).
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the judiciary in the eyes of the public. 3 Scott challenged the reprimand as violation
of his constitutional rights.2e4
After determining that Scott's statements touched upon matters of public con-
cern, the court weighed the state's interest in regulating judicial speech against the
judge's interest, as a citizen, in making statements of public concern. 2 5 The court
noted that Scott, as a justice of the peace, was a public official.2°6 The court then
declared that the state may restrict elected judges speech more than ordinary elected
officials because the state must preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judi-
ciary.2 However, the state failed to present any evidence showing that Scott's state-
ments interfered with the impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary. Thus the state
failed to prove that its interests outweighed Scott's interests in speaking on a matter
of public concern. 8
In applying the balancing test to situations wherein judges draft legislation the
results arguably weigh in the government's favor. The judiciary plays a central role
in our American scheme of justice,209 and the legitimacy of the judiciary depends
upon the judiciary appearing fair and impartial. t0 When judges draft legislation, they
do not appear impartial, thereby imperiling the foundation of our justice system. 21
The government enjoys a strong interest in preserving an institution designed to
protect all individuals. Such an interest may overcome a judge's constitutional right
to freedom of speech when the government presents evidence that the speech in
question interferes with the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. Thus, it
203. Id at 204.
204. L at 205.
205. Id. at 211; see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. at 388 (articulating the following factors to consider in
assessing the government's interest as an employer. Whether the statement (1) impairs supervisors in disciplining
employees; (2) infringes upon harmony in the work place; (3) erodes close working relationships in which loyalty
and confidence are necessary; (4) thwarts the speaker's ability to adequately perform his or her duties; and (5)
hinders the enterprise in its regular operation). Interestingly, the court stated that the state had a "very difficult
burden" to carry in showing that its interests outweighed that of Scott. See Scott, 910 F.2d at 212. The court derived
this statement from Rankin wherein the Rankin court asserted that the state must prove, "on legitimate grounds,"
that its interests outweighed those of the individual. Id., n.7 (citing Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388). Neither Pickering,
Connick, nor Rankin impose a "very difficult burden" standard on the government. Thus, it is unclear whether the
Fifth Circuit was imposing these conditions on its own or whether it was merely describing the nature of the burden
encompassed in the above Supreme Court cases.
206. Scott, 910 F.2d at 211-212.
207. Id
208. Id. at 213.
209. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
210. See CAL. CODE OF JuD. ETics, Canon 1, advisory committee commentary (stating that irresponsible
or unfair conduct ofjudges undermines the American system of government).
211. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text (describing how judges undermine the authority and
legitimacy of the judiciary by drafting legislation).
212. Scott, 910 F.2d at 213. Other elected officials are elected based, in part, upon particular results or
policies they seek to implement. Conversely, judges must remain impartial in order to properly fulfill their duties.
- Therefore, judicial statements regarding the furtherance of particular results interfere with a judge's ability to
properly fulfill thejudge's duties. Accordingly, the government may restrict the speech of elected judges more than
that of other elected officials.
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appears that the government may be able to limit a judge's speech to protect the
legitimacy of the judiciary.
Despite the arguable validity of such action, California has failed to provide clear
guidelines to address this situation and to protect the legitimacy of the judiciary. The
participation of judges in drafting California's controversial Three Strikes law com-
bined with the vagaries of California's Code of Judicial Ethics, argue for more
definite standards of judicial conduct to prevent the erosion of the judiciary's legiti-
macy. The absence of clear guidance mandates a high level of caution on the part of
judges who act in this manner.
V. MAINTAINING APPEARANCES WHILE IMPROVING THE LAW
This Comment does not urge that the legislature and the judiciary return to the
"proud and silent isolation" lamented by Justice Cardozo.1 3 While judicial parti-
cipation in the drafting of legislation poses risks to judicial integrity and impartiality,
judges have much to offer in improving our legal system. 214 A legitimate balance
must be found between judges acting as "passive machines" and judges acting as
"zealous reformers. '215 The problem lies in capitalizing upon the special expertise
and experience of the judiciary in order to improve our laws without jeopardizing the
judiciary's integrity and impartiality.
Although ethical codes provide guidance in this area, judges are left to speculate
about what the ubiquitous but elusive "reasonable person" would think of the judge's
actions. Yet a "reasonable person" test fails to instruct a well intentioned judge
where, in the vast abyss between clearly reasonable and clearly unreasonable, his or
her contemplated actions lie.
The preservation of the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary should guide
judges' actions when they contemplate drafting legislation. Although the individual
conduct of judges does not violate the separation of powers doctrine,216 two kinds of
problems arise when judges draft legislation. The first problem is issue specific; it
involves the judiciary's ability to neutrally adjudicate legislation authored by a fellow
judge. This problem includes such concerns as an individual judge's neutrality and
the effect one judge's actions may have on another judge's ability to assess a parti-
cular issue neutrally.2 17 The second problem involves governmental structure and its
213. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 114 (1922).
214. See CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETmcs, Canon 4(B), advisory committee commentary (noting that judges are
especially qualified to identify and correct problems with legislation).
215. Bagula & Coates, supra note 163, at 630 (quoting Herman Lum, Our Role as Judges in Modern Society,
Cr. REv., Winter 1987 4,6).
216. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (explaining that one judge may be influenced by the fact
that another judge authored a particular piece of legislation).
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effect on the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.2t8 The judiciary's parti-
cipation in politics lies at the heart of this category. t9 These concerns may be depen-
dent upon the nature of the legislation and the judge's role in participating in its
development.
In order to evaluate the propriety of his or her participation in drafting legis-
lation, a judge must assess his or her contemplated action in light of the above two
concerns. A judge should consider both the nature of the legislation and his or her
role in participating in its creation. This Comment proposes that a judge who parti-
cipates in the legislative process acts in one of three roles according to the type of
legislation. First, a judge may be acting as a "housekeeper," seeking to maintain and
improve the administration of justice. Typically, such actions would involve
procedural issues facing the court such as the time within which to respond to a parti-
cular motion. Courts historically have enjoyed the power to make "housekeeping"
rules.22 Tradition tends to cloak this type of action with an air of legitimacy.
Second, a judge may be acting as a "mechanic" by attempting to correct
problems with the underlying legislation. In this role the judge does not sit in judg-
ment of his or her own creations, nor does the judge sit in judgment of another
judge's creation.22t Rather, the judge merely seeks to effectuate the intent of the
underlying legislation and to minimize any attendant problems with the legislation.
The judge's lack of a personal agenda regarding the legislation serves to mitigate the
questionable appearance that he or she might otherwise convey. Moreover, the statute
the judge seeks to "repair" may not be political or controversial.222 Therefore, the
risks of appearing partial appear minimal.
However, other considerations may convey the appearance of impartiality. A
statute's political or controversial nature may taint a judge's action.23 Additionally,
there is always the risk that the public may perceive the judge as furthering his or her
own personal political agenda.
Finally, there is the role of the judge as a "substantive policy maker." In this role,
the judge seeks to create new law that shapes the policy of our nation. Of the three
roles, this role is the least legitimate because the judge acts, or appears to be acting,
in a manner reserved for the legislative branch of the government. The Constitution
envisions the legislature as the policy maker for the nation. By drafting legislation,
218. See Geyh, supra note 8, at 1167 (noting that the judiciary's legitimacy derives from its independent
judgment); Timm, supra note 16, at 263-64 (arguing that separating the judiciary from politics preserves the
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary).
219. Timm, supra note 16, at 264.
220. See Hannah v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
221. See supra note 127-28 and accompanying text (arguing that a judge participating in the drafting of
legislation jeopardizes the integrity and impartial appearance of the judiciary because the resulting legislation may
be challenged before that judge or that judge's colleagues).
222. See Ginsberg & Huber, supra note 164, at 1431-32 (stating that many statutes in need of repair are not
political in the "partisan sense").
223. See id. at 1433-34 (asserting that their proposed law revision committee, which contains at least one
judge, should refrain from participating in the clarification of politically controversial or complex legislation).
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a judge enmeshes the judiciary in politics contrary to the judiciary's constitutional
mandate.
Due to the partial appearance a judge may convey when acting as a "mechanic"
or a "substantive policy maker," a judge risks the integrity of the judiciary when he
or she acts as anything other than a "housekeeper." Accordingly, judges who wish
to participate in the drafting of legislation should do so only when the legislation
involves non-controversial administration of justice issues. Indeed, even then an
individual judge who drafts legislation may appear to be stepping beyond the
institutional bounds of the judiciary. Given the risks involved with this type of
activity, perhaps judges should ask themselves whether it is necessary for them to
individually draft legislation.
Although judges have much to offer in improving our legal system, "improve-
ment" does not necessarily demand judicial participation in the drafting of legis-
lation.224 By drafting legislation, judges place the "judicial imprimatur" on that
particular statute, closely associating the judicial with the legislative.225 Such action
erodes the judiciary's appearance of impartiality.226 Because the judiciary's sole
source of legitimacy derives from its appearance of impartiality and integrity, judges
should be particularly mindful of the shadow their actions may cast on judicial
legitimacy.227
In response to our increasingly complex society, courts have become more apt to
blur the traditional lines separating the three branches of government.228 However,
no general need exists for judges to draft legislation. Lawyers, law professors,
politicians, and many other individuals are capable of drafting legislation.229 Yet,
judges do possess special knowledge regarding the operations of the court. Effective
procedural and "housekeeping" legislation demands judicial involvement because of
the judiciary's expertise in these areas. Indeed, the judiciary historically has enjoyed
the power to establish its own housekeeping rules. 230 Therefore, although drafting
legislation itself is arguably a political act, judicial rulemaking in this arena does not
present the same risks as in other areas.
When judges become too closely linked with a particular piece of non-
housekeeping legislation, they jeopardize the integrity and impartial appearance of
224. See CAL. CODE OF JuD. ETHics, Canon 4(B), advisory committee commentary (noting that judges are
especially qualified to identify and correct problems with legislation).
225. Kelso, supra note 126, at 864.
226. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (articulating how judges jeopardize the impartial
appearance of the judiciary by drafting legislation).
227. See generally Fried, supra note 17 (discussing sources of judicial legitimacy).
228. See llistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (declaring that the Court's separation of powers
jurisprudence "has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with
ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives").
229. See Kelso, supra note 126, at 864 (suggesting that other individuals are equally capable of drafting
legislation).
230. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388; Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).
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the judiciary. This proposition leads directly to a proposed solution: if judges wish
to improve society by participating in the creation of legislation, they should distance
themselves from its actual creation. A judge may distance himself or herself from
legislation by ensuring that his or her contributions are "filtered" through other non-
judicial persons. This filter separates the judge from an arguably political act and
maintains the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary while allowing for valuable
judicial contributions to society. For instance, a judge may testify before the
legislature, participate on independent committees, write, speak, and perform other
activities that do not directly associate the judge with the legislative process as does
drafting legislation."' By pursuing reform in this manner, a judge contributes an idea
which other persons may mold into legislation. z 2
In addition, judges could participate on commissions that seek to improve the
legal infrastructure of our society. Participation in some type of committee dealing
with administration of justice matters mitigates the risks posed by the independent
actions of a judge or members of the judiciary. Such committees are generally made
up of individuals other than judges.233 By acting as a member of an independent
commission, the drafts of legislation appear to "represent the collected wisdom of an
independent, public spirited commission, rather than the work... of arguably self-
interested judges" even where the draft was in fact drafted by a particular judge.2
Even then, judges should pay particular attention to the type of legislation the
committee or commission seeks to cure. Participation on committees or commissions
that are in the public eye or that deal with controversial legislation still jeopardizes
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, whereas participation on commissions
or committees dealing with the administration of justice do not.235 Thus, participation
on certain commissions or committees serves to protect the appearance of impar-
tiality and integrity of the judiciary by deflecting the attention away from a particular
judge and towards the commission." 6
The above considerations demonstrate that room exists for judicial input in the
creation of legislation. However, applying these considerations to the actions of the
231. See Kelso, supra note 126, at 863 (approving of judges writing articles or speaking before legal groups
as a means of contributing to legal development).
232. l&
233. See Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 164, at 1433 (proposing that a statutory revision commission should
be made up of four legislators, a fully retired federal judge as chairman, and four to six presidential appointees).
Note, however, that Justice Ginsburg's proposal fails to include an acting federal judge on the committee. Id.
234. Geyh, supra note 8, at 1227.
235. See id. at 1227-28 n.314; Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 164, at 1431-32 (asserting that the proposed
law revision commission should refrain from participating in the clarification of politically controversial or complex
legislation because of the appearance such activity conveys); see also supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text
(explaining why judicial activity in the arena of administration of justice does not jeopardize the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary).
236. Geyh, supra note 8, at 1227. But see CAL CODE OF JUD. ETHICs, Canon 4(C)(2) (prohibiting judges from
accepting an appointment to a government commission or committee concerned with non-judicial factual or policy
matters).
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judges who participated in the drafting of Three Strikes demonstrates that such
conduct should not be repeated. First, the judges were, to some extent, involved in
the writing of a highly controversial piece of political legislation, appearing as any-
thing but "neutral arbiters" of our country's laws. Second, through their involvement,
the judges became too closely associated with the controversial legislation. If they
felt compelled to contribute to the creation of Three Strikes, they should have done
so in a more indirect manner so as to ensure the judiciary's appearance of integrity
and impartiality.
VI. CONCLUSION
As both the Separation of Powers Doctrine and codes of judicial ethics
recognize, our governmental system depends on the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. When judges become too closely associated with a particular piece of
legislation, they compromise the judiciary's role as a neutral arbitrator of our
country's laws. Arguably, the distinctions between the different types of actions in
the legislative arena are distinctions of degree, not substance. However, where the
very legitimacy of one branch of our governmental system depends on the public's
perception, appearances are critical. Accordingly, judges should be particularly
mindful that any shadow their actions may cast will not be long enough to stain the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge who wishes to participate in the
improvement of our country's laws may do so in a plethora of less controversial
ways. Risking the integrity of the judiciary is not necessary. Simply put, "judges
should not moonlight as legislators. ' ' 3'
237. Kelso, supra note 126, at 865.

